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Using survey data on expectations, we examine whether the post-war
data are consistent with theories of a self-fulﬁlling inﬂation episode during
the 1970s. Among commonly cited factors, oil and ﬁscal shocks do not
appear to have triggered an increase in expected inﬂation that was sub-
sequently validated by monetary policy. However, the evidence suggests
that, prior to 1979, the Fed accommodated temporary shocks to expected
inﬂation, which then led to permanent increases in actual inﬂation. We do
not ﬁnd this behavior in the post-1979 data.
21. Introduction
The post-war inﬂation experience of the U.S. economy is dominated by the
dramatic acceleration of inﬂation during the decades of the 1960s and 1970s
a n dt h es h a r pd i s i n ﬂation of the 1980s. The sustained peacetime inﬂation
of the 1970s had no parallel in the previous 100 years of U.S. history.1
Why was inﬂation so high in the 1970s and low in the 1980s and 1990s? An
understanding of high and low inﬂation episodes would help in the design
of monetary policy institutions that will reduce the likelihood of revisiting
the poor outcomes of the 1970s.
Recent, and perhaps controversial, theories of high and low inﬂation
center on the idea that high inﬂations can come about because increases in
inﬂation expectations become self-fulﬁlling as a consequence of the nature of
monetary policymaking and monetary institutions. One avenue by which
self-fulﬁlling inﬂations can come about is that the monetary authority may
ﬁnd itself in a bind when confronted with an upward revision to inﬂation
expectations: It can either choose to accommodate the higher expectations,
resulting in higher actual inﬂation, or it can choose not to accommodate and
suﬀer the consequence of a drop in output and employment. In this light,
the experience of the 1970s is interpreted as demonstrating that monetary
policymakers were unwilling to pay the costs of disinﬂation in a self-fulﬁlling
inﬂation environment. On the other hand, during the 1980s, monetary
policymakers were willing to pay the costs of disinﬂation, and inﬂation
came down rapidly, though at the cost of a severe recession.
We examine whether the post-war data are consistent with theories of a
self-fulﬁlling inﬂation episode during the 1970s that was reined in by more
aggressive monetary policy in the 1980s and 1990s. The unique aspect
of our empirical methodology is the use of a long time series on inﬂation
expectations from the Philadelphia Fed’s Livingston Survey. Since 1946,
this survey has been recording forecasters’ expectations of CPI inﬂation and
many other macroeconomic variables. The beneﬁto fu s i n gt h es u r v e yd a t a
is that we have independent information on inﬂation expectations and so do
not have to impose modeling assumptions to generate those expectations.2
The Livingston Survey data are used in several small VAR models to
study whether monetary policy in the 1970s accommodated sudden move-
1See DeLong (1997)
2Although the Michigan Survey of Households and the Survey of Professional Forecasters
also maintain a database on expected inﬂation, their series start in the 1960s.
3ments in expected inﬂation resulting in highly persistent actual inﬂation.
Our evidence suggests that it did. During the 1970s, temporary shocks that
increased expected inﬂation led to permanent increases in actual inﬂation.
However, during the 1980s and 1990s, we do not ﬁnd this permanent inﬂa-
tion response to temporary shocks in the data. Consistent with theories
that associate sunspots and self-fulﬁlling inﬂations with activist monetary
policy, we ﬁnd that the 1970s represent an episode in which rising inﬂation
was accompanied by a falling real interest rate.
The theories that underlie self-fulﬁlling inﬂations suggest there may be
ap e r m a n e n tr i s ei ni n ﬂa t i o ni nr e s p o n s et ot e m p o r a r ys h o c k st of u n d a -
mentals or to exogenous movements in expectations via sunspot equilibria.
What triggered the rise in expected inﬂation in the 1970s? We investigate
t h er e s p o n s eo fi n ﬂation expectations to oil price shocks, monetary policy
shocks, and ﬁscal shocks. For the most part, we ﬁnd that oil and ﬁscal
shocks are not associated with long-lasting, statistically signiﬁcant increases
in expected or actual inﬂation. On the other hand, our results indicate that
temporary monetary policy shocks, which raise expected inﬂation, lead to a
persistent eﬀect on the inﬂation rate. We also ﬁn das t r o n ga n ds i g n i ﬁcant
inﬂation response to exogenous shocks to expected inﬂation: A one-time
exogenous increase in expected inﬂation leads to signiﬁcantly higher inﬂa-
tion 10 years after impact. However, we show that expectations shocks
are much more important for the variability of inﬂation and the unemploy-
ment rate than monetary policy shocks. Expectations shocks account for
approximately 50 percent of the variability of inﬂation and 20 percent of
the variability of unemployment in the pre-1979 data. In comparison, the
contribution of monetary policy shocks is 10 and 5 percent, respectively.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section brieﬂy
describes the theoretical ﬁndings of models of self-fulﬁlling inﬂation and
the channels through which they operate. We then describe the behavior
of actual and expected inﬂation since the mid-1950s and discuss our iden-
tiﬁcation procedures for the diﬀerent shocks we wish to analyze. Section
5 introduces the benchmark model and describes our main ﬁndings, and
Section 6 conducts some sensitivity analysis. The last section concludes.
2. Theories of Self-Fulﬁlling Inﬂation
The expectations trap hypothesis, as developed in Chari, Christiano and
Eichenbaum (1998), and Albanesi, Chari, and Christiano (2001,2002), pro-
4vides a mechanism by which expected inﬂation can become self-fulﬁlling in
a dynamic, general equilibrium environment with rational agents. These
models build on the time-inconsistency literature of Kydland and Prescott
(1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983) in modeling policymakers at the level
of objectives and constraints, but extend those models by explicitly mod-
eling the actions of a rational private sector.
An expectations trap is a situation in which a benevolent monetary au-
thority may be pushed into accommodating the inﬂation expectations of
the private sector because the cost of not doing so is an undesirable loss
of output and employment. Dynamic inconsistency and lack of a commit-
ment technology make possible self-fulﬁlling inﬂation equilibria. Without
commitment, two types of expectations traps can arise. In the ﬁrst, agents
expect monetary policymakers will react to shocks that don’t aﬀect prefer-
ences or technology. Thus, nonfundamental shocks may become a source
of volatility for the economy. In the second type of expectations trap,
the monetary authority may overreact to fundamental shocks, amplifying
volatility. In this situation, temporary shocks to fundamentals may lead
to long-lasting eﬀects on variables like inﬂation. In the expectations trap
models, the principal driving force for multiplicity of equilibria is that de-
fensive actions taken by households and ﬁrms to protect themselves from
high inﬂation reduce the costs of inﬂation for policymakers.3
A second, closely related line of research that investigates self-fulﬁlling
inﬂation outcomes is the work of Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) and
Christiano and Gust (1999, 2000). These models diﬀer from Chari et al.
and Albanesi et al. in that policymakers are modeled at the level of decision
rules rather than at the level of objectives and constraints. Clarida et al.
estimate a forward-looking Taylor rule for the 1970s and use it in a small
sticky-price, dynamic ISLM model to show that the Fed’s 1970s policy gave
rise to indeterminacy. The key mechanism by which these models can
deliver self-fulﬁlling inﬂation outcomes is that the coeﬃcient on expected
inﬂa t i o ni nt h eT a y l o rr u l ei sl e s st h a no n e . T h u s ,ar i s ei ne x p e c t e d
inﬂation leads to a fall in the real interest rate. In Clarida et al., this
3In Chari et al. and Albanesi et al. unexpected inﬂation raises output because some prices
are sticky. Monopoly power causes output to be ineﬃciently low. When ﬁrms expect high
inﬂation, they set high prices. If the monetary authority does not accommodate, output will be
low. When households expect high inﬂation, they will shift consumption away from goods that
require cash for their purchase. Hence, the cost of unanticipated inﬂation will be low, and the
monetary authority has an incentive to inﬂate.
5stimulates spending by standard sticky-price mechanisms, leading to a rise
in output that eventually gives way to a rise in inﬂation.
Christiano and Gust use the Taylor rule estimated by Clarida et al. for
the 1970s in a limited participation model to examine whether that model
better explains the 1970s data. In particular, their model accounts for the
simultaneous rise in inﬂation and drop in output during the 1970s.4 In
Christiano and Gust’s limited participation framework, the fall in the real
interest rate leads households to reduce deposits with ﬁnancial intermedi-
aries, which puts upward pressure on nominal interest rates (ﬁrms borrow
to ﬁnance their wage bill). The monetary authority pursues a policy of
not letting the nominal interest rate rise too much, so it injects liquidity
that eventually leads to higher inﬂation. Since the monetary authority
does permit some rise in the nominal interest rate, output and employment
fall.5 Thus, the limited participation model gives a stagﬂation outcome.
Note that the Clarida et al. model does not give an expectations trap out-
come, and so diﬀers from the analysis of the other papers cited. In Clarida
et al., an exogenous rise in expected inﬂation does not put the central bank
in the dilemma of choosing between higher inﬂation or lower growth. If the
monetary authority chooses not to accommodate higher inﬂation expecta-
tions, it simply prevents output and inﬂation from simultaneously going
above trend.
3. Actual and Expected Inﬂation in the 1970s
The dynamics of inﬂation, expected inﬂation, and the real interest rate
are plotted in Figure 1. Actual inﬂation begins a marked acceleration
b e g i n n i n gi nt h em i dt ol a t e1 9 6 0 sa n dp e a k e di n1 9 7 9 . E x p e c t e di n ﬂation
rose through the late 1960s and 1970s as well, but largely underpredicted
actual inﬂation during the period when actual inﬂation was accelerating
and overpredicted inﬂation during the disinﬂation of the early 1980s. The
4The Clarida et al. model may be able to deliver a drop in output in response to revised
expectations in a self-fulﬁlling inﬂation environment if the revision to expectations is due to a
bad supply shock.
5The mechanism in Chari et al. and Albanesi et al. is slightly diﬀerent. In those models,
higher expected inﬂation leads people to demand and receive higher wage settlements. Firms
pay higher wages because they expect the general price level to be higher, so higher labor costs
can be passed on to the public. If the Fed does not accommodate the higher expected inﬂation,
real labor costs rise, leading to lower output and employment.
6expected inﬂation series shows much less volatility than the actual inﬂation
series.
Figure 1 shows that monetary policy was very accommodative in the
1970s, with the real interest rate turning negative between 1974 and 1977.
T h es t a n c eo fm o n e t a r yp o l i c yb e c a m em u c hm o r er e s t r i c t i v eb yt h ee n d
of the decade. Indeed, at the end of 1979, the real interest rate was
approximately 3.5 percent, more than 150 basis points above its historical
average. But for a temporary drop in the early 1980, the real interest rate
continued to rise, reaching close to 7 percent in 1981. With tight monetary
policy in place, inﬂation and expected inﬂation fell rapidly and stabilized
around 2 to 2.5 percent in the mid-1990s.
I st h ef a c tt h a te x p e c t e di n ﬂa t i o nt e n d e dt ol a ga c t u a li n ﬂation evi-
dence against the view that the inﬂation of the 1970s was the result of self-
fulﬁlling expectations or an expectations trap?6 It is true that expected
inﬂation lagged actual inﬂation, but expected inﬂation rose strongly during
the 1970s. Statements by Federal Reserve oﬃcials suggest that the Fed was
surprised at how strong and resilient inﬂation expectations seemed to be,
even during recessions. In addition, the record suggests the Fed believed
that bringing down expectations would require a recession whose economic
and political consequences were deemed to be unacceptably high.7 The
record suggests that the Fed saw itself on the horns of a dilemma: recession
or inﬂation. We think that a more thorough attempt at identifying what
could be a sudden, unanticipated rise in expected inﬂation, or the response
of expected inﬂation to diﬀerent shocks hitting the economy, is required
before the self-fulﬁlling inﬂation hypothesis can be rejected.8
4. Fundamentals or Sunspots?
Several factors have been cited as contributing to the inﬂation acceleration
of the 1970s. Supply shocks, such as the OPEC production cutbacks
and oil embargoes were contributing factors to upward pressure on the
level of the CPI. Government spending accelerated sharply from 1964 to
1967 with the Great Society programs and Vietnam war buildup. Under
6See Delong (1997) and Andolfatto (1999) for an exposition of this view.
7See Christiano and Gust (2000) and Chari, Christiano, and Eichenbaum (1998) for some of
the relevant excerpts from Federal Reserve oﬃcials’ statements to the public and Congress.
8T h ef a c tt h a te x p e c t e di n ﬂation consistently lagged actual inﬂation throughout the 1970s
and early 1980s seems to be problematic for any theory based on rational expectations.
7the self-fulﬁlling inﬂations hypothesis, any increase in expected inﬂation,
exogenous or endogenous, could lead to permanently higher inﬂation under
an accommodative monetary policy.9
4.1. Oil and Government Spending Shocks
The self-fulﬁlling inﬂation hypothesis requires that an increase in expected
inﬂation, by whatever means, leads to an increase in actual inﬂation. Here,
we discuss two fundamental shocks that may have led to increases in ex-
pected inﬂation.
The sudden and unprecedented rise in oil prices in 1973-74 and again
in 1979 is a widely cited factor in explanations of the 1970s inﬂation (see
Blinder [1979,1982]). Prices for crude oil rose from about $3 per barrel in
mid-1973 to more than $10 per barrel in 1974. At the end of 1978, oil prices
averaged about $14 per barrel, and then rose to more than $30 per barrel
in 1979. Hamilton (1983) convincingly demonstrates that exogenous oil
price increases triggered most economic downturns in the post-World War
II period.10 However, evidence on the inﬂation eﬀects of the oil shocks
is less clear (see Barsky and Killian [2001]). Blinder (1982) argues that
special factors, such as oil price increases, contributed to a large extent to
t h er i s ei noverall inﬂation. However, if oil price shocks are a key element
of the inﬂation story, one needs to explain how one-time increases in oil
prices led to permanent, or at least very long-lasting, increases in overall
inﬂation. If oil price shocks led to an increase in expected inﬂation that
was accommodated by monetary policy, a long-lasting eﬀect on inﬂation
could result.
Although the two OPEC oil embargoes contributed to the rise in inﬂa-
tion in the 1970s, Figure 1 suggests that the beginning of the acceleration of
inﬂation dates to the mid-late 1960s, well before the oil price shocks hit the
economy. DeLong (1997) and others have argued that a more likely inﬂa-
tionary trigger was the increase in government spending associated with the
Great Society programs and the Vietnam war. Again, though, the ﬁscal
shocks appear to be temporary in nature and so would be unlikely to drive
9In models of self-fulﬁlling inﬂations, permanently higher money growth is typically not the
trigger for the acceleration of inﬂation. Therefore, we do not think of this possibility when we
refer to fundamentals.
10The extent to which oil price increases per se cause recession has also been subject to debate
(see Bernanke, Gertler, and Watson [1997], Hamilton and Herrara [2000], and Leduc and Sill
[2001]).
8al a s t i n gi n ﬂation, absent an accommodative monetary policy. Inﬂation
continued to accelerate well after these ﬁscal shocks hit the economy.
Our empirical exercises examine whether exogenous, one-time increases
in oil prices and government spending led to increases in expected inﬂa-
tion and permanent increases in inﬂation during the 1970s. To identify
exogenous, unanticipated increases in oil prices, we use the quantitative
dummy variable developed by Hamilton (1999). This variable captures
the disruptions in the oil market due to political events in the Middle East
that are arguably exogenous to developments in the U.S. economy.11 The
dummy variable takes a value equal to the drop in oil production for these
historical episodes and is otherwise set to zero. To identify ﬁscal shocks,
we use the narrative account of Ramey and Shapiro (1998). Their reading
of the post-war U.S. data leads them to identify three exogenous and unan-
ticipated ﬁscal shocks: 1950:3, which is associated with the Korean War;
1965:1, capturing the Vietnam War eﬀort; and 1980:1, the Carter-Reagan
military buildup.12
4.2. Expectations Shocks
In the Chari et al. and Albanesi et al. models that deliver self-fulﬁlling
inﬂation equilibria, expectations can react to fundamental shocks or to pure
s u n s p o t s . E v e nm o r es ot h a ni nt h ec a s eo fo i la n dﬁscal shocks, identifying
an exogenous movement in expected inﬂation is diﬃcult. However, we
exploit the design of the Livingston Survey to aid in identifying expected
inﬂation shocks. An understanding of our identiﬁcation scheme requires
some detail on how the Livingston Survey is conducted.
The survey, which was initiated in 1946, reports eight-month-ahead fore-
casts by a pool of professional forecasters, on several economic variables.13
The forecasters are from nonﬁnancial businesses, investment banking ﬁrms,
commercial banks, academic institutions, and from labor, government, and
insurance companies.14 T h es u r v e yi sc o n d u c t e dt w i c eay e a r . S u r v e y
11Hamilton identiﬁes the following dates as being associated with exogenous declines (in para-
thenses) in world petroleum supply: November 1956 (10.1%), November 1973 (7.8%), December
1978 (8.9%), October 1980 (7.2%), and August 1990 (8.8%).
12See Eichenbaum (1998) and Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) for an appliciation
of this identiﬁcation strategy in a VAR.
13Note that the survey also reports 14-month-ahead forecasts.
14The average number of responses for the survey is about 50. Moreover, the survey does
not give complete information on who provided each forecast.
9questionnaires go out in May and November, after the release of the CPI
data for April and October, and are returned before the release of the CPI
data for May and November (see Croushore [1997]).15 A timeline of the
survey is shown in Figure 2. A forecaster receiving the survey in May 2002
(when the CPI for April is known) is asked to predict the level of the CPI
in December 2002, which requires an eight-month forecast. The forecaster
will then receive another survey questionnaire in November 2002 and be
asked to predict the level of the CPI in June 2003. The timing of the
survey is critical for our identiﬁcation of expected inﬂation shocks. The
survey’s timing suggests putting expected inﬂation ﬁrst in a recursive iden-
tiﬁcation scheme, since when making time t forecasts, agents do not know
the time t r e a l i z a t i o no fi n ﬂation (and the other variables in our VAR), by
construction.
Of course, any expectations shocks that we claim are exogenous could
only be so to the extent that our statistical model includes all the fundamen-
tals that drive movements in expected inﬂation. Since it is unlikely that
any model could take into account all the variables agents use in making
inﬂation forecasts, we think of our identiﬁed expectations shocks as being
due to sunspots and/or to omitted fundamentals. To the extent that our
model includes the fundamentals that drive expected inﬂation, the proba-
bility that our identiﬁed expectations shock is exogenous is higher. Note,
though, that for the self-fulﬁlling inﬂations hypothesis this distinction is
not so important. Both transitory fundamental and sunspot shocks can
have long-lasting eﬀects on inﬂation through the interaction of expectations
and monetary policy.16
Another potential problem with our identiﬁcation scheme is that fore-
casters, when forming expectations for the survey, may have access to data
unobserved by the econometrician that give information about actual in-
ﬂation. In eﬀect, this means that expected inﬂation would be responding
to contemporaneous data. It takes time to mail out and receive the sur-
vey, and agents are continuously updating their forecasts over this time.
Since we cannot fully include agents’ conditioning sets in our VAR, it is
sensible to think of allowing expected inﬂation shocks to be contemporane-
ously conditioned on other variables in the model. We follow this strategy
in the empirical section and assess the importance of alternative Cholesky
orderings for the results.
15Note that the CPI data are released with a one-month delay.
16Note, however, that similar criticisms about omitted variables can be leveled at any VAR.
105. Empirical Model
We set up a benchmark VAR with four variables: expected CPI inﬂation
(EPDOT), CPI inﬂation (PDOT), the unemployment rate (U), and the
t h r e e - m o n t hT - b i l lr a t e( R ) ,p l u sad u m m yv a r i a b l ec a p t u r i n ge i t h e ro i l
shocks (O) or shocks to government spending (G).17 Because of the timing
of the Livingston Survey, our data are at a six-month frequency: from April
to October, and October to April. Actual inﬂation for the period between
April and October is constructed as the log of the ratio of the October CPI
level to the April CPI level (similarly for the period between October and
April). The unemployment and T-bill rates are six-month averages of the
monthly data. Because the inﬂation forecasts are really eight-month-ahead
forecasts, the constructed measure of expected inﬂation is slightly diﬀerent
from the constructed measure of actual inﬂation. In particular, suppose
we are in May 2002 (see Figure 2) right after the April CPI data have been
released. Expected inﬂation is measured as the expected CPI in December
2002 divided by the observed CPI in April 2002 (an eight-month period).
Though we describe the data as bi-annual, the observations in EPDOT
in the Livingston survey overlap: expected inﬂation has a horizon of eight
months, while the other variables in our system are measured at a six-
month frequency.18 This data construction is used so that forecasters are
not given more information in the VAR at time t than they really have.
T os e et h i s ,i m a g i n ew ea r ei nM a y2 0 0 2( s e eF i g u r e2 )a n dw o r k i n go nt h e
June survey. Forecasters’ information set for the June survey includes the
April 2002 CPI data, but not the May CPI (which is released in June). An
eight-month measure of actual inﬂation would include June data (i.e., the
data would cover the period October 2001 to June 2002).19
Finally, note that since the frequency of our data diﬀers from that of
Hamilton’s (1999) quarterly analysis, the timing of our dummy variable is
slightly diﬀerent from his. We constructed our dummy variable by setting
17We use the unemployment rate to avoid real-time data issues associated with revisions
in real GDP. Since they are generally limited to changes in seasonal factors, revisions in the
unemployment rate are historically less important than those for real GDP.
18Our measures of the T-bill, inﬂation, and expected inﬂation rates are annualized. All
variables are expressed in percentage points.
19The potential problem with aligning the data as we do is that serial correlation may be
introduced because of the overlapping data intervals. However, this does not appear to be a
severe problem, since the unit of time in our VAR (six months) is longer than the period over
which the data overlap (two months).
11the drop in production equal to that in Hamilton (1999), whenever one
of the historical episodes he described falls within one of our six-month
periods. The same is true of our dating of the Ramey-Shapiro (1998) ﬁscal
shocks.
Our benchmark model is a VAR on expected inﬂation, inﬂation, the
unemployment rate, and the federal funds rate:
Yt = A(L)Yt−1 + B(L)Dt + ut, (5.1)
where Yt is a 4x1 vector of data and Dt represents a dummy variable for
either oil (O) or government spending shocks (G).20 A(L)a n dB(L)a r e
ﬁnite-ordered matrix-polynomials in nonnegative power of L, the lag oper-
ator. SIC tests indicate that two lags are suﬃcient to capture the system
dynamics.
The benchmark speciﬁcation uses a recursive identiﬁcation scheme for
generating impulse response functions with the ordering [EPDOT, PDOT,
U, R]. Expected inﬂation is ordered ﬁrst since, by construction, it is prede-
termined for our data. Because the frequency of our dataset is bi-annual,
we assume that the Fed can freely adjust the interest rate in response
to contemporaneous movements in all the other variables in the system.
Hence, we order the federal funds rate last. The sensitivity of the system
to alternative orderings of the variables is examined below.
We investigate impulse responses to see if the predictions of theories of
self-fulﬁlling expectations are conﬁrmed in the 1970s data. As in Clarida
et al., we estimate our VARs over two sample periods: 1952:1 to 1979:1 and
1979:2 to 2001:1.21 For the pre-1979 era, we look to see if temporary shocks
to expectations and fundamentals lead to permanent eﬀects on inﬂation via
an accommodative monetary policy. We examine whether the response to
shocks then changed in post-1979 era.
Temporary shocks to fundamentals can have permanent eﬀects on the
inﬂation rate only if the latter is a unit root process. The augmented
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test is used to test the data for unit roots. Table 1
reports the results for both the pre- and the post-Volcker periods. The
tests indicate that the unit root null hypothesis cannot be rejected for
inﬂation, expected inﬂation, nominal interest rate, and unemployment rate
20Because there are relatively few data points per estimated VAR coeﬃcient, the eﬀects of oil
and government spending shocks are analyzed separately.
21N o t et h a tb e c a u s ew eh a v et w ol a g s ,o u re ﬀective sample is 1953:1 to 1979:1 for the pre-
Volcker period and 1980:2 to 2000:1 for the post-Volcker era.
12in the pre-1979 era. On the other hand, we can reject the hypothesis
that actual and expected inﬂation follow unit processes in the post-Volcker
period, though we cannot reject the null for the nominal interest rate and
the unemployment rate. These results suggest that temporary shocks to
either fundamentals or to expectations could, ap r i o r i ,lead to permanent
eﬀects on inﬂation in the 1970s, but that this will not occur in the post-
Volcker era. To verify this conjecture, we now look at the response of the
economy to oil, ﬁscal, expectations, and monetary policy shocks.
5.1. Oil Shock
Figure 3 presents system impulse responses to a one-time unit change in
Hamilton’s quantitative oil variable ([I − A(L)]
−1 B(L)). The ﬁrst column
of the ﬁgure presents the responses for the pre-1979 estimated model and
the second column the responses for the post-1979 estimated model. In
each plot, the solid line represents the point estimate, while dashed lines
denote a 90 percent conﬁdence interval.22 The ﬁgure shows that, pre-1979,
a temporary oil shock initially leads to a signiﬁcant rise in both expected
and actual inﬂation, but the response of these variables is not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero one year after the shock. Positive oil shocks lead to a
rise in the unemployment rate (of about 21 basis points), one year following
the shock, with this increase persisting for about one year.
In the pre-1979 estimates, the real interest rate falls in response to a
positive oil shock, reaching its maximum drop about 18 months after the
shock.23 Thus, monetary policy appears to be passive. However, since the
temporary oil shock does not lead to a long-lasting eﬀect on actual inﬂation,
we conclude that it is unlikely that this shock is the trigger that set up the
inﬂation take-oﬀ in the 1970s. Note also that the impact of oil shocks on
the economy is much less substantial post-1979, with only the initial rise in
actual inﬂation being signiﬁcant.
5.2. Fiscal Policy
We use Ramey and Shapiro’s (1998) ﬁscal dummy variable to investigate
whether a positive, transitory ﬁscal shock in the mid-1960s led to long-
lasting inﬂation. This may have occurred if it led the public to revise their
22We use the bootstrap Monte Carlo method described in Eichenbaum (1998).
23The real interest rate response is constructed as the diﬀerence between the nominal interest
rate response and the expected inﬂation response.
13inﬂation expectations upward, and the Fed then validated these expecta-
tions. Figure 4 shows the impact of a transitory ﬁscal shock in our model.
The ﬁgure presents impulse response functions only for the pre-1979 pe-
riod, since we do not have a shock to government spending that falls in the
post-1979 era.24
The impulse response point estimates are consistent with the ﬁndings of
Ramey and Shapiro (1998) and Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999)
on the eﬀects of government spending shocks. However, in contrast to
these models, our speciﬁcation includes an equation that captures the in-
terest rate response of the Fed to an unanticipated change in ﬁscal policy.
An increase in government spending leads to a delayed increase in eco-
nomic activity, represented by the drop in the unemployment rate one year
following the shock. Inﬂation rises, peaking at the same time as the unem-
ployment rate. The Fed responds to this change in ﬁscal policy by raising
the nominal interest rates enough, initially, to raise the real interest rate.
However, the increase in the nominal interest rate is not strong enough to
keep the real interest rate from falling two years after the shocks. This
relatively passive policy then brings about a permanent rise in actual and
expected inﬂation. Note, though, that none of our point estimates are
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 90 percent conﬁdence level. In this
respect, we diﬀer from the results in Ramey et al. and Edelberg et al. As in
the case of an oil shock, an unanticipated increase in government spending
does not bring about a statistically signiﬁcant, long-lasting increase in the
inﬂation rate.
5.3. Expectations Shocks
Consider now the eﬀect of an unanticipated, one-time shock to expected
inﬂation. Figure 5 presents the impulse responses, with the ﬁrst and sec-
ond columns describing, respectively, the response of the economy before
and after 1979.25 Looking at the pre-1979 results, a positive, one-time
24It is true that Ramey and Shapiro isolated 1980:1 as an exogenous event that led to a large
military buildup and that this date falls in the post-Volcker period. However, because of our
lag structure (two lags), our eﬀective sample starts in 1980:2. Similarly, our pre-1979 sample,
which eﬀectively covers the period from 1953:1 to 1979:1, includes only the military buildup of
1965:1.
25Our impulse responses to expectations and monetary policy shocks are normalized such that
the contemporanous own responses are unity.
14shock to expected inﬂation leads to a large and permanent increase in both
actual and expected inﬂation. Moreover, these responses are signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero for more than 10 years after the shock, in sharp con-
trast to the eﬀects of oil and ﬁscal shocks. Actual inﬂation rises about
1.5 percent one year after the exogenous increase in expected inﬂation, and
then stabilizes around one percent higher than it was prior to the shock.
The Fed responds to the jump in expected inﬂation by raising the nominal
interest rate, but the rise is not enough to increase the real interest rate,
which initially falls 50 basis points. Note that the drop in the real interest
rate is statistically signiﬁcant both initially and in the longer run. The
monetary policy response is strong enough to stimulate the economy in the
ﬁrst year, with the unemployment rate falling 0.5 percent. But in the long
run, both unemployment and inﬂation are higher.The impulse responses
for the post-1979 period are in striking contrast to those of the pre-1979
period. An unanticipated increase in expected inﬂation brings about an
initial rise in actual inﬂation, but this increase is quickly reversed and is
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero one year after the shock. Just as in the
pre-1979 era, the nominal interest rate increases following the shock, but by
l e s st h a nt h er i s ei ne x p e c t e di n ﬂation, so the real interest rate also rises.26
Monetary policy appears to be much more active: The real interest rate
rises sharply in response to higher expected inﬂation. As a consequence,
t h er i s ei ne x p e c t e di n ﬂation is rapidly reversed so that expected inﬂation
returns to zero about two years after the shock. The activist policy leads
to an economic slowdown: The unemployment rate rises 50 basis points
three years after the shock.27
On balance, our impulse response functions seem to provide evidence
for a self-fulﬁlling inﬂation/expectations trap story for the 1970s inﬂation.
Note, though, our evidence is not quite in agreement with the predictions of
sticky-price models of self-fulﬁlling inﬂations as explanations of the 1970s
inﬂation. Recall that in the model of Clarida et al. output is demand
determined. When the monetary authority is passive, a rise in expected
inﬂation leads to a fall in real interest rates that stimulates demand and
26The fact that the real interest rate rises in response to an expectations shock suggests there
would no indeterminacy in a standard equilibrium monetary model. In this case, expectations
are a deterministic function of the economy’s state variables. An expectations shock, in our
framework, could then be interpreted as a mismeasurement error to which the Fed may then
respond.
27Note that the unemployment rate initially falls, probably because the real interest rate is
unchanged initially (in a statistical sense) and only starts rising half a year after the shock.
15increases output and employment. Eventually, the rise in output fully
gives way to higher inﬂation. Our impulse responses suggest that indeed
real interest rates fell in response to a rise in expected inﬂation, but the
unemployment rate rises as well, resulting in a stagﬂation. Our evidence
is more in line with the predictions of a model like that in Christiano and
Gust (2000) where higher expected inﬂation and passive monetary policy
can lead to lower real interest rates, higher nominal interest rates, and lower
employment.
5.4. Monetary Policy
Can monetary policy shocks account for the high inﬂation of the 1970s? Fig-
ure 6 presents the response functions of the variables to a one-percentage-
point increase in the nominal interest rate. In the pre-Volcker era, the
increase in the nominal interest rate initially raises the real rate because
expected inﬂation is predetermined in our benchmark speciﬁcation. Actual
and expected inﬂation rise, suggesting a strong Fisher eﬀect, which is not
surprising given the highly accommodative nature of policy in that period.
Actual and expected inﬂa t i o ns t a yh i g he v e ni nt h el o n gr u n( a l t h o u g ht h e
conﬁdence interval is only marginally above zero). On the other hand, as
shown in the second column of Figure 6, the economy, post-1979, behaves
much more in accord with typical ﬁndings from VAR analysis. The positive
monetary shock leads to a rise in the unemployment rate and to a fall in
actual and expected inﬂation. Moreover, temporary changes in monetary
policy, in this period, do not bring about persistent changes in inﬂation.
How is it that a temporary change in monetary policy leads to such
long-lasting eﬀects on inﬂation in the pre-1979 era? Using a structural
VAR to study U.S. economic ﬂuctuations, Gali (1992) estimates perma-
nent responses of nominal variables to money supply and IS shocks. He
argued that the presence of this unit root possibly resulted from the desire
of the Fed to stabilize output and avoid the costs of a recession by sim-
ply accommodating the positive eﬀects of the shocks on the inﬂation rate.
Clarida et al.’s estimated Taylor rule (as discussed in Section 2) suggests
that Fed policy in the 1970s could introduce nominal and real indetermina-
cies in a simple framework with nominal rigidities. A standard monetary
policy shock, in a model with a passive monetary authority and multiple
equilibria, could have a permanent eﬀect on the inﬂation rate, through its
eﬀects on expected inﬂation.
Our results do suggest that monetary policy has been more active in the
16post-1979 era, since temporary shocks to expectations and fundamentals do
not lead to permanent responses in inﬂation. Orphanides (2001) suggests
that the reason for the 1970s high inﬂation was that the Fed placed a lot
of weight on stabilizing output and mismeasured the expected output gap
because it was slow to recognize the productivity slowdown that began in
the early 1970s. As a consequence, it ran an easy monetary policy that
resulted in higher inﬂation. Orphanides’ estimates suggest that the Fed
was about equally aggressive in responding to expected inﬂa t i o ni nt h ep r e -
and post-1979 eras. Our evidence, on the other hand, suggests that the
Fed did not respond as strongly to expected inﬂation shocks in the 1970s
as it did in the post-1979 era.
5.5. A Historical Reading of U.S. Inﬂation
How important are the various shocks in our statistical model in accounting
for the variability of inﬂation and unemployment? We saw that temporary
expectations shocks led to persistent inﬂation responses in the pre-1979 era,
but are expectations shocks an important component of the overall variation
in inﬂation? Table 2 shows the variance decompositions of inﬂation and
unemployment for our benchmark speciﬁcation in the pre- and post-1979
episodes. We computed the variance of the six- and twelve-step-ahead
forecast error (which corresponds to three and six years) that is attributable
to each variable: inﬂation, expected inﬂation, unemployment, and nominal
interest rate shocks. In the pre-1979 period, we ﬁnd that a little less than
50 percent of the variance of inﬂation can be attributed to expectations
shocks, a number about ﬁve times as large as the contribution of interest
rate shocks. The importance of expectations shocks for the variability of
inﬂation post-1979 is also very large: 30 percent, which is again about ﬁve
times as much as the contribution of monetary policy shocks.
Expectations shocks also account for a substantial fraction of the un-
employment rate forecast variance in both the pre- and post-1979 periods.
In fact, about 30 percent of that variability is due to expectations shocks,
and monetary policy shocks contribute only about 5 percent. Note that,
in the post-1979 era, a larger share of the unemployment variability is ac-
counted for by expectations shocks. This is consistent with the view that,
post-1979, the Fed accepted more volatile unemployment to achieve lower
inﬂation. In this view, the Fed reacts quickly and strongly to a rise in
17expected inﬂation.28
The historical decomposition of the U.S. inﬂation rate oﬀers another
perspective in understanding the contribution of expectations shocks to
the time path of inﬂation. We again split the data set into two periods:
pre- and post-1979. The historical decomposition of inﬂation is based on





The summation term captures the movement in inﬂation that is due to the
realized structural errors between periods T +1a n dT + j.T h e t e r m
ETYT+j is the forecast of YT+j based on information available at time T.
The decompositions begin with the ﬁrst period of each era, so the fore-
cast of YT+j at the start date reﬂects initial conditions, the (estimated)
constant term, and the deterministic dummy variable capturing oil shocks.
The historical decompositions are shown in Figure 7. The ﬁrst row of
the ﬁgure shows the actual and forecast values of inﬂation for the pre- and
post-1979 periods. The plots in the second through ﬁfth rows show the
cumulative contribution of structural shocks to inﬂation, expected inﬂa-
tion, unemployment, and monetary policy. We also plot the diﬀerence
between actual inﬂation and its forecast (i.e., YT+j − ETYT+j)i ne a c ho f
the graphs. For both the pre-1979 and post-1979 eras, the broad contour
of the deviations of inﬂation from trend is driven primarily by shocks to
expected and actual inﬂation. Observe that as inﬂation reached new peaks
between 1965 and 1979, the cumulative contribution of expected inﬂation
shocks was generally rising, which means that shocks to expected inﬂation
contributed positively to inﬂation. Moreover, the cumulative eﬀect of ex-
pectations shocks on inﬂation appears nonstationary in the pre-Volcker era
and stationary post-1979. This agrees with our earlier conclusion that
expectations shocks have very long-lasting eﬀects on the inﬂation rate pre-
1979, but not thereafter. Finally, the ﬁgure shows that the contribution
of monetary policy and unemployment shocks to actual inﬂation are much
smaller than the contribution of shocks to expected inﬂation during both
eras.
28Our results are diﬀerent than those of Lubik and Schorfheide (2002), who, based on a
maximum likelihood estimation of a monetary model with sunspot equilibria, found that the
contribution of sunspot shocks to aggregate ﬂuctuations was small.
186. Sensitivity Analysis
To gauge the sensitivity of our results, we modify the benchmark speciﬁ-
cation to take into account two possibilities: (i)a g e n t s ’i n ﬂation forecasts
are conditioned on contemporaneous data, unobserved by the econometri-
cian, so that expected inﬂation is not predetermined;(ii) the behavior of the
economy after 1979 is contaminated by the inclusion in the post-1979 sam-
ple of the monetarist experiment between 1979 and 1982, which represents
a structural change in monetary policy.
6.0.1. Re-Ordering Expected Inﬂation
To analyze whether predetermined expected inﬂation is important for our
results, we re-order the vector Yt in equation (5.1) as: PDOT, U, EPDOT,
R. Hence, expected inﬂation can react to contemporanous information on
inﬂation and the unemployment rate in our recursive identiﬁcation scheme.
We order expected inﬂation before the nominal interest rate, since we are
interested in understanding how the Fed responds to changes in expected
inﬂation.29
Figure 8 shows the impulse response functions for an expectations shock
under our alternative ordering. Overall, the response of the economy is very
similar to that under the benchmark speciﬁcation shown in Figure 5. The
general message from the alternative ordering is that a shock to expected
inﬂation leads to a long-lasting increase in actual inﬂation, consistent with
the view that the Fed validates the rise in expected inﬂation by letting the
real interest rate fall. In this sense, our model is robust to the alternative
ordering.
6.0.2. The Monetarist Experiment
Is monetary policy responsible for the better inﬂation performance of the
U.S. economy since 1979, or was it luck? Ireland (1999) argues that a
sequence of bad supply shocks pushed the natural rate of unemployment
up in the 1970s. This then brought about a rise in the inﬂation rate because
of the time-inconsistency problem faced by the central bank. The Fed was
able to bring the inﬂation rate down in the post-1979 era only because it
did not face a similar series of bad shocks. In a related paper, Sims and
Zha (2002) argue that the only period since 1950 with a noticeably diﬀerent
29The impulse responses are very similar to the baseline model when we order EPDOT last.
19monetary policy is the monetarist experiment between 1979 and 1982, in
which the Fed targeted monetary aggregates. Otherwise, monetary policy
in the 1970s and the post-1982 period appears to be very similar. Sims
and Zha do ﬁnd that the period since 1982 is characterized by a decrease
in the volatility of shocks hitting the economy.
To investigate this possibility, we removed the 1979-1982 period from the
post-1979 era. We then assessed whether there is a change in the economy’s
response to expectations shocks. Figure 9 describes the results. This set
of impulse response functions clearly shows that expectations shocks did
not lead to a long-lasting increase in the inﬂation rate during the post-1982
era. However, the data do not allow us to attribute this change in the
response of the economy to a more active monetary policy: For instance,
the real interest rate does not rise substantially in the post-1982 period.
As a result, we cannot rule out the possibility that the structure of the
economy (other than monetary policy) changed between the pre-1979 and
post-1982 periods.
7. Conclusion
We examined whether the post-war data are consistent with theories of a
self-fulﬁlling inﬂation episode in the 1970s. Our evidence suggests that
it is. During the pre-1979 era, temporary shocks to expected inﬂation
led to a permanent increase in actual inﬂation, which did not occur post-
1979. The mechanism by which this occurred was a passive monetary
policy: The real interest rate fell in response to the expectations shock.
Our results for the 1979-2001 sample suggest that monetary policy became
more active, with the Fed responding aggressively to an increase in expected
inﬂation. However, once we remove the ”monetarist” episode of 1979-82, it
is diﬃcult to distinguish Fed behavior post-1982 from that of the pre-1979
era. Nonetheless, we do ﬁnd, for the post-1982 era, that temporary shocks
to expectations do not lead to long-lasting eﬀects on actual inﬂation.
Self-fulﬁlling inﬂations can arise because of shocks to expectations and
shocks to fundamentals. We found that exogenous oil and ﬁscal shocks did
not contribute signiﬁcantly to the 1970s inﬂation. However, monetary pol-
icy shocks did have long-lasting consequences for inﬂation. This can hap-
pen when monetary policy accommodates higher expectations. Nonethe-
less, the contribution of monetary policy shocks for the variability of in-
ﬂation is dwarfed by that of expectations, which accounted for about 50
20percent of that variance.
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24Table 1. Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test for Unit Roots
Pre-1979 Post-1979
ρ ADF ρ ADF
EPDOT 1.06 --- 0.87 -2.96**
PDOT 0.95 -0.57 0.54 -5.07**
 U 0.82 -2.53 0.91 -2.25
R 0.97 -0.41 0.85 -2.14
ρ is the coefficient estimate on the lagged variable. The variables are as described in the text. ** denotes
significance at the 5-percent level, using MacKinnon’s (1991) critical values. EPDOT = expected inflation,
PDOT = inflation, U = unemployment rate, and R = nominal interest rate.
Table 2. Variance Decomposition of Inflation and Unemployment
(Benchmark Specification)
PDOT EPDOT U R
Inflation
Pre-1979
3 years 39.86 47.36 3.56 9.23
6 years 37.01 49.37 2.48 11.15
Post-1979
3 years 62.56 30.27 1.12 6.04
6 years 61.96 30.40 1.62 6.02
Unemployment
Pre-1979
3 years 10.26 21.54 65.32 2.88
6 years 13.22 28.02 53.80 4.97
Post-1979
3 years 3.860 41.285 44.900 9.955
6 years 7.988 47.330 35.532 9.150
All entries are in percentage term. The variables are as described in the text. 3 and 6 years refer to














































Real Rate Expected CPI Inflation Actual CPI Inflation
Actual inflation is measured by the actual change in the CPI over six months. The 8-month forecast of the CPI level from the Livingston survey is used 
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In the first row of the figure, the squares denote the foreast of inflation and the trangles represent actual inflation.
In rows 2-5, the solid line represents the difference between actual inflation and the forecast, while the dotted line 
represents the cumulative contribution of the structural shocks to either PDOT, EPDOT, U, and R. 
PDOT = inflation, EPDOT = expected inflation, U = unemployment rate, R = nominal interest rate.
The units on the y-axis are in percent.
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PDOT = inflation, EPDOT = expected inflation, U = unemployment rate, R = nominal interest rate, RR = nominal interest rate - 
expected inflation. The units on the y-axis are in percent, while those on the x-axis are in years.